Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents by Yang, Jiachen et al.
Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents
Jiachen Yang∗
Georgia Institute of Technology
jiachen.yang@gatech.edu
Ang Li
DeepMind
anglili@google.com
Mehrdad Farajtabar
DeepMind
farajtabar@google.com
Peter Sunehag
DeepMind
sunehag@google.com
Edward Hughes
DeepMind
edwardhughes@google.com
Hongyuan Zha
Georgia Institute of Technology
zha@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
The challenge of developing powerful and general Reinforcement Learning (RL)
agents has received increasing attention in recent years. Much of this effort has
focused on the single-agent setting, in which an agent maximizes a predefined
extrinsic reward function. However, a long-term question inevitably arises: how
will such independent agents cooperate when they are continually learning and
acting in a shared multi-agent environment? Observing that humans often provide
incentives to influence others’ behavior, we propose to equip each RL agent in a
multi-agent environment with the ability to give rewards directly to other agents,
using a learned incentive function. Each agent learns its own incentive function by
explicitly accounting for its impact on the learning of recipients and, through them,
the impact on its own extrinsic objective. We demonstrate in experiments that
such agents significantly outperform standard RL and opponent-shaping agents in
challenging general-sum Markov games, often by finding a near-optimal division
of labor. Our work points toward more opportunities and challenges along the path
to ensure the common good in a multi-agent future.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [34] agents are achieving increasing success on an expanding set
of tasks [25, 18, 29, 38, 5]. While much effort is devoted to single-agent environments and fully-
cooperative games, there is a possible future in which large numbers of RL agents with imperfectly-
aligned objectives must interact and continually learn in a shared multi-agent environment. Excluding
the option of centralized training with a global reward, which faces difficulty in scaling to large
populations and may not be adopted by self-interested parties, it is difficult for groups of agents to
achieve high individual and collective return [26]. Moreover, agents in many real world situations
with mixed motives, such as settings with nonexcludable and subtractive common-pool resources,
may face a social dilemma wherein mutual selfish behavior leads to low individual and total utility,
due to fear of being exploited or greed to exploit others [27, 20, 21]. Whether, and how, independent
learning and acting agents can cooperate while optimizing their own objectives is an open question.
The conundrum of attaining multi-agent cooperation with decentralized2 training of agents, who
may have misaligned individual objectives, requires us to go beyond the restrictive mindset that
the collection of predefined individual rewards cannot be changed by the agents themselves. We
draw inspiration from the observation that this fundamental multi-agent problem arises at multiple
∗Work done during internship at DeepMind.
2We take decentralized to mean that no agent is designed with an objective to maximize collective perfor-
mance, and that agents optimize separate sets of policy parameters.
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: The N -player Escape Room game ER(N,M). For M < N , if fewer than M agents pull
the lever, which incurs a cost of −1, then all agents receive −1 for changing positions. Otherwise,
the agent(s) who is not pulling the lever can get +10 at the door and end the episode.
scales of human activity and, crucially, that it can be successfully resolved when agents give the right
incentives to alter the objective of other agents, in such a way that the recipients’ behavior changes
for everyone’s advantage. Indeed, a significant amount of individual, group, and international effort
is expended on creating effective incentives or sanctions to shape the behavior of other individuals,
social groups, and nations [36, 7, 8]. The rich body of work on game-theoretic side payments
[17, 15, 13] further attests to the importance of inter-agent incentivization in society.
Translated to the framework of Markov games for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) [23],
the key insight is to remove the constraints of an immutable reward function. Instead, we allow agents
to learn an incentive function that gives rewards to other learning agents and thereby shape their
behavior. The new learning problem for an agent becomes two-fold: learn a policy that optimizes
the total extrinsic rewards and incentives it receives, and learn an incentive function that alters other
agents’ behavior so as to optimize its own extrinsic objective. While the emergence of incentives in
nature may have an evolutionary explanation [14], human societies contain ubiquitous examples of
learned incentivization and we focus on the learning viewpoint in this work.
The Escape Room game. We may illustrate the benefits and necessity of incentivization with a
simple example. The Escape Room game ER(N,M) is a discrete N -player Markov game with
individual extrinsic rewards and parameter M < N , as shown in Figure 1. An agent gets +10
extrinsic reward for exiting a door and ending the game, but the door can only be opened when M
other agents cooperate to pull the lever. However, an extrinsic penalty of −1 for any movement
discourages all agents from taking the cooperative action. If agents optimize their own rewards with
standard independent RL, no agent can attain positive reward, as we show in Section 5.
This game may be solved by equipping agents with the ability to incentivize other agents to pull
the lever. However, we hypothesize—and confirm in experiments—that merely augmenting an
agent’s action space with a “give-reward” action and applying standard RL faces significant learning
difficulties. Consider the case of ER(2, 1): suppose we allow agent A1 an additional action that sends
+2 reward to agent A2, and let it observe A2’s chosen action prior to taking its own action. Assuming
that A2 conducts sufficient exploration, an intelligent reward-giver should learn to use the give-reward
action to incentivize A2 to pull the lever. However, RL optimizes the expected cumulative reward
within one episode, but the effect of a give-reward action manifests in the recipient’s behavior only
after many learning updates that generally span multiple episodes. Hence, a reward-giver may not
receive any feedback within an episode, much less an immediate feedback, on whether the give-
reward action benefited its own extrinsic objective. Instead, we need an agent that explicitly accounts
for the impact of incentives on the recipient’s learning and, thereby, on its own future performance.
As a first step toward addressing these new challenges, we make the following conceptual, algorithmic,
and experimental contributions. (1) We create an agent that learns an incentive function to reward
other learning agents, by explicitly accounting for the impact of incentives on its own performance,
through the learning of recipients. (2) Working with agents who conduct policy optimization, we
derive the gradient of an agent’s extrinsic objective with respect to the parameters of its incentive
function. We propose an effective training procedure based on online cross-validation to update the
incentive function and policy on the same time scale. (3) We show convergence to mutual cooperation
in a matrix game, and experiment on a new deceptively simple Escape Room game, which poses
significant difficulties for standard RL and action-based opponent-shaping agents, but on which our
agent consistently attains the global optimum. (4) Finally, our agents discover near-optimal division
of labor in the challenging and high-dimensional social dilemma problem of Cleanup [16]. Taken
together, we believe this is a promising step toward a cooperative multi-agent future.
2
2 Related works
Learning to incentivize other learning agents is motivated by the problem of cooperation among
independent learning agents in intertemporal social dilemmas (ISDs) [20], in which defection is
preferable to individuals in the short term but mutual defection leads to low collective performance
in the long term. Algorithms for fully-cooperative MARL [12, 28, 32] may not be applied as ISDs
have mixed motives and cannot canonically be reduced to fully cooperative problems. Previous work
showed that collective performance can be improved by independent agents with intrinsic rewards
[9, 16, 39], which are either hand-crafted or slowly evolved and modulate each agent’s own extrinsic
reward. In contrast, a reward-giver’s incentive function in our work is learned on the same timescale
as policy learning and is given to, and maximized by, other agents. Empirical research shows that
augmenting an agent’s action space with a “give-reward” action can improve cooperation during
certain training phases in ISDs [24].
Learning to incentivize is a form of opponent shaping, whereby an agent learns to influence the
learning update of other agents for its own benefit. While LOLA [11] and SOS [22] exert influence
via actions taken by its policy, whose effects manifest through the Markov game state transition, our
proposed agent exerts direct influence via an incentive function, which is distinct from its policy
and which explicitly affects the recipient agent’s learning update. Hence the need to influence other
agents does not restrict a reward-giver’s policy, potentially allowing for more flexible and stable
shaping. We describe the mathematical differences between our method and LOLA in Section 3.1,
and experimentally compare with LOLA agents augmented with reward-giving actions.
Our work is related to a growing collection of work on modifying or learning a reward function that is
in turn maximized by another learning algorithm [4, 31, 41]. Previous work investigate the evolution
of the prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix when altered by a “mutant” player who gives a fixed incentive
for opponent cooperation [2]; employ a centralized operator on utilities in 2-player games with side
payments [31]; and directly optimize collective performance by centralized rewarding in 2-player
matrix games [4]. In contrast, we work with N -player Markov games with self-interested agents
who must individually learn to incentivize other agents and cannot optimize collective performance
directly. Our technical approach is inspired by online cross validation [33], which is used to optimize
hyperparameters in meta-gradient RL [40], and by the optimal reward framework [30], in which a
single agent learns an intrinsic reward by ascending the gradient of its own extrinsic objective [41].
3 Learning to incentivize others
We design Learning to Incentivize Others (LIO), an agent that learns an incentive function by
explicitly accounting for its impact on recipients’ behavior, and through them, the impact on its own
extrinsic objective. For clarity, we describe the ideal case where agents have a perfect model of other
agents’ parameters and gradients; afterwards, we remove this assumption via opponent modeling.
We present the general case of N LIO agents, indexed by i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N}. Each agent gives
rewards using its incentive function and learns a regular policy with all received rewards. For clarity,
we use index i when referring to the reward-giving part of an agent, and we use j for the part that
learns from received rewards. For each agent i, let oi := Oi(s) ∈ O denote its individual observation
at global state s; ai ∈ Ai its action; and −i a collection of all indices except i. Let a and pi denote
the joint action and the joint policy over all agents, respectively.
A reward-giver agent i learns a vector-valued incentive function rηi : O ×A−i 7→ RN−1, parame-
terized by ηi ∈ Rn, that maps its own observation oi and all other agents’ actions a−i to a vector
of rewards for the other N − 1 agents3. Let rjηi denote the reward that agent i gives to agent j. As
we elaborate below, rηi is separate from the agent’s conventional policy and is learned via direct
gradient ascent on the agent’s own extrinsic objective, involving its effect on all other agents’ policies,
instead of via RL. Hence, while one may interpret LIO to have an augmented action space with an
additional channel of influence on other agents, LIO’s learning approach is fundamentally different
from a standard RL agent who has a “give-reward” action.
3We do not allow LIO to reward itself, as our focus is on influencing other agents’ behavior. Nonetheless,
LIO may be complemented by other methods for learning intrinsic rewards [41].
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We build on the idea of online cross-validation [33], to capture the fact that an incentive has measurable
effect only after a recipient’s learning step. As such, we describe LIO in a procedural manner below
(Algorithm 1). This procedure can also be viewed as an iterative method for a bilevel optimization
problem [6], where the upper level optimizes the incentive function by accounting for recipients’
policy optimization at the lower level. At each time step t, each recipient j receives a total reward
rj(st,at, η
−j) := rj,env(st,at) +
∑
i 6=j
rjηi(o
i
t, a
−i
t ) , (1)
where rj,env denotes agent j’s extrinsic reward. Each agent j learns a standard policy pij , parameter-
ized by θj ∈ Rm, to maximize the objective
max
θj
Jpolicy(θj , η−j) := Epi
[
T∑
t=0
γtrj(st,at, η
−j)
]
. (2)
Upon experiencing a trajectory τ j := (s0,a0, r
j
0, . . . , sT ), the recipient carries out an update
θˆj ← θj + βf(τ j , θj , η−j) (3)
that adjusts its policy parameters with learning rate β (Algorithm 1, lines 4-5). Assuming policy
optimization learners in this work and choosing policy gradient for exposition, the update function is
f(τ j , θj , η−j) =
T∑
t=0
∇θj log pij(ajt |ojt )Gjt (τ j ; η−j) , (4)
where the return Gjt (τ
j , η−j) =
∑T
l=t γ
l−trj(sl,al, η−j) depends on incentive parameters η−j .
After each agent has updated its policy to pˆij , parameterized by new θˆj , it generates a new trajectory
τˆ j . Using these trajectories, each reward-giver i updates its individual incentive function parameters
ηi to maximize the following individual objective (Algorithm 1, lines 6-7):
max
ηi
J i(τˆ i, τ i, θˆ, ηi) := Epˆi
[
T∑
t=0
γtrˆi,envt
]
− αL(ηi, τ i) . (5)
The first term is the expected extrinsic return of the reward-giver in the new trajectory τˆ i. It
implements the idea that the purpose of agent i’s incentive function is to alter other agents’ behavior
so as to maximize its extrinsic rewards. The rewards it received from others are already accounted by
its own policy update. The second term is a cost for giving rewards in the first trajectory τ i:
L(ηi, τ i) :=
∑
(oit,a
−i
t )∈τ i
γt‖rηi(oit, a−it )‖1 . (6)
This cost is incurred by the incentive function and not by the policy, since the latter does not determine
incentivization4 and should not be penalized for the incentive function’s behavior (see Appendix A.1
for more discussion). We use the `1-norm so that cost has the same physical “units” as extrinsic
rewards. The gradient of (6) is directly available, assuming rηi is a known function approximator
(e.g., neural network). Letting J i(τˆ i, θˆ) denote the first term in (5), the gradient w.r.t. ηi is:
∇ηiJ i(τˆ i, θˆ) =
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi θˆj)T∇θˆjJ i(τˆ i, θˆ) . (7)
The first factor of each term in the summation follows directly from (3) and (4):
∇ηi θˆj = β
T∑
t=0
∇θj log pij(ajt |ojt )
(
∇ηiGjt (τ j ; η−j)
)T
. (8)
Note that (3) does not contain recursive dependence of θj on ηi since θj is a function of incentives in
previous episodes, not those in trajectory τ i. The second factor in (7) can be derived as
∇θˆjJ i(τˆ i, θˆ) = Epˆi
[∇θˆj log pˆij(aˆj |oˆj)Qi,pˆi(sˆ, aˆ)] . (9)
4Note that the outputs of the incentive function and policy are conditionally independent given the agent’s
observation, but their separate learning processes are coupled via the learning process of other agents.
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Algorithm 1 Learning to Incentivize Others
1: procedure TRAIN LIO AGENTS
2: Initialize all agents’ policy parameters θi, incentive function parameters ηi
3: for each iteration do
4: Generate a trajectory {τ j} using θ and η
5: For all reward-recipients j, update θˆj using (3)
6: Generate a new trajectory {τˆ i} using new θˆ
7: For reward-givers i, compute new ηˆi by gradient ascent on (5)
8: θi ← θˆi, ηi ← ηˆi for all i ∈ [N ].
9: end for
10: end procedure
In practice, to avoid manually computing the matrix-vector product in (7), one can define the loss
Loss(ηi, τˆ i) := −
∑
j 6=i
T∑
t=0
log piθˆj (aˆ
j
t |oˆjt )
T∑
l=t
γl−tri,env(sˆl, aˆl) , (10)
and directly minimize it via automatic differentiation [1]. Crucially, θˆj must preserve the functional
dependence of the policy update step (4) on ηi within the same computation graph. Derivations of (9)
and (10) are similar to that for policy gradients [35] and are provided in Appendix C.
LIO is compatible with the goal of achieving emergent cooperation in fully-decentralized MARL,
as agents already learn individual sets of parameters to maximize individual objectives. One may
directly apply opponent modeling [3] when LIO can observe, or estimate, other agents’ egocentric
observations, actions, and individual rewards, and have common knowledge that all agents conduct
policy updates via reinforcement learning. These requirements are satisfied in environments where
incentivization itself is feasible, since these observations are required for rational incentivization.
LIO may then fit a behavior model for each opponent, create an internal model of other agents’ RL
processes, and learn the incentive function by differentiating through fictitious updates using the
model in place of (3). We demonstrate a fully-decentralized implementation in our experiments.
3.1 Relation to opponent shaping via actions
LIO conducts opponent shaping via the incentive function. This resembles LOLA [11], but there are
key algorithmic differences. Firstly, LIO’s incentive function is trained separately from its policy
parameters, while opponent shaping in LOLA depends solely on the policy. Secondly, the LOLA
gradient correction for agent i is derived from ∇θiJ i(θi, θj + ∆θj) under Taylor expansion, but
LOLA disregards a term with ∇θi∇θjJ i(θi, θj) even though it is non-zero in general. In contrast,
LIO is constructed from the principle of online cross-validation [33], not Taylor expansion, and
hence this particular mixed derivative is absent—the analogue for LIO would be∇ηi∇θjJ i(θi, θj),
which is zero because incentive parameters ηi affect all agents except agent i. Thirdly, LOLA
optimizes its objective assuming one step of opponent learning, before the opponent actually does so
[22]. In contrast, LIO updates the incentive function after recipients carry out policy updates using
received incentives. This gives LIO a more accurate measurement of the impact of incentives, which
reduces variance and increases performance, as we demonstrate experimentally in Appendix E.1
by comparing with a 1-episode variant of LIO that does not wait for opponent updates. Finally, by
adding differentiable reward channels to the environment, which is feasible in many settings with
side payments [17], LIO is closer in spirit to the paradigm of optimized rewards [30, 18, 39].
3.2 Analysis in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
A1/A2 C D
C (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
D (0, -3) (-2, -2)
LIO poses a challenge for theoretical analysis in general Markov
games because each agent’s policy and incentive function are
updated using different trajectories but are coupled through the
RL updates of all other agents. Nonetheless, a complete analysis
of exact LIO—using closed-form gradient ascent without policy
gradient approximation—is tractable in repeated matrix games. In the stateless Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD), for example, with payoff matrix in Table 1, we prove in Appendix B the following:
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Figure 2: Exact LIO in IPD: probability of recipient cooperation versus incentive for cooperation.
Proposition 1. Two LIO agents converge to mutual cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Moreover, we may gain further insight by visualizing the learning dynamics of exact LIO in the
IPD, computed in Appendix B. Let η1 := [η1C , η
1
D] ∈ [0, 3]2 be the incentives that Agent 1 gives to
Agent 2 for cooperation (C) and defection (D), respectively. Let θ2 denote Agent 2’s probability
of cooperation. In Figure 2, the curvature of vector fields shows guaranteed increase in probability
of recipient cooperation θ2 (vertical axis) along with increase in incentive value η1C received for
cooperation (horizontal axis). For higher values of incentive for defection η1D, greater values of η
1
C
are needed for θ2 to increase. Figure 7 shows that incentive for defection is guaranteed to decrease.
4 Experimental setup
Our experiments demonstrate that LIO agents are able to reach near-optimal individual performance
by incentivizing other agents in cooperation problems with conflicting individual and group utilities.
We define three different environments with increasing complexity in Section 4.1 and describe the
implementation of our method and baselines in Section 4.2.
4.1 Environments
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). We test LIO on the memory-1 IPD as defined in [11], where
agents observe the joint action taken in the previous round and receive extrinsic rewards in Table 1.
This serves as a test of our theoretical prediction in Section 3.2.
N -Player Escape Room (ER). We experiment on the N -player Escape Room game shown in
Figure 1 (Section 1). By symmetry, any agent can receive positive extrinsic reward, as long as there
are enough cooperators. Hence, for methods that allow incentivization, every agent is both a reward
giver and recipient. We experiment with the cases (N = 2,M = 1) and (N = 3,M = 2). We also
describe an asymmetric 2-player case and results in Appendix E.1.
Waste
Apple
Agents
Cleaning 
beam
Figure 3: Cleanup (10x10 map):
apple spawn rate decreases with in-
creasing waste, which agents can
clear with a cleaning beam.
Cleanup. Furthermore, we conduct experiments on the
Cleanup game (Figure 3) [16, 39]. Agents get +1 individual
reward by collecting apples, which spawn on the right hand
side of the map at a rate that decreases linearly to zero as the
amount of waste in a river approaches a depletion threshold.
Each episode starts with a waste level above the threshold and
no apples present. While an agent can contribute to the public
good by firing a cleaning beam to clear waste, it can only do so
at the river as its fixed orientation points upward. This would
enable other agents to defect and selfishly collect apples, result-
ing in a difficult social dilemma. Each agent has an egocentric
RGB image observation that spans the entire map.
4.2 Implementation and baselines
We describe key details here and provide a complete description in Appendix D.2. In each method,
all agents have the same implementation without sharing parameters. The incentive function of a LIO
agent is a neural network defined as follows: its input is the concatenation of the agent’s observation
and all other agents’ chosen actions; the output layer has size N , sigmoid activation, and is scaled
element-wise by a multiplier Rmax; each output node j, which is bounded in [0, Rmax], is interpreted
as the real-valued reward given to agent with index j in the game (we zero-out the value it gives
to itself). We chose Rmax = [3, 2, 2] for [IPD, ER, Cleanup], respectively, so that incentives can
overcome any extrinsic penalty or opportunity cost for cooperation. We use on-policy learning with
policy gradient for each agent in IPD and ER, and actor-critic for Cleanup. To ensure that all agents’
policies perform sufficient exploration for the effect of incentives to be discovered, we include an
exploration lower bound  such that p˜i(a|s) = (1− )pi(a|s) + /|A|, with linearly decreasing .
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Figure 5: Escape Room. (a,c) LIO agents converge near the global optimum with value 9 (N=2) and
8 (N=3). (b,d) Incentives received for each action by the agent who ends up going to the lever/door.
Fully-decentralized implementation (LIO-dec). Each decentralized LIO agent i learns a model of
another agent’s policy parameters θj via θjestimate = argmaxθj
∑
(ojt ,a
j
t)∈τ log piθj (a
j
t |ojt ) at the end
of each episode τ . With knowledge of agent j’s egocentric observation and individual rewards, it
conducts incentive function updates using a fictitious policy update in (3) with θjestimate in place of θ
j .
Baselines. The first baseline is independent policy gradient, labeled PG, which has the same
architecture as the policy part of LIO. Second, we augment policy gradient with discrete “give-reward”
actions, labeled PG-d, whose action space isA×{no-op, give-reward}N−1. We try reward values in
the set {2, 1.5, 1.1}. Giving reward incurs an equivalent cost. Next, we design a more flexible policy
gradient baseline called PG-c, which has continuous give-reward actions. It has an augmented action
spaceA×[0, Rmax]N−1 and learns a factorized policy pi(ad, ar|o) := pi(ad|o)pi(ar|o), where ad ∈ A
is the regular discrete action and ar ∈ [0, Rmax]N−1 is a vector of incentives given to the other N − 1
agents. Appendix D.2 describes how PG-c is trained. In ER, we run LOLA-d and LOLA-c with the
same augmentation scheme as PG-d and PG-c. In Cleanup, we compare with independent actor-critic
agents (AC-d and AC-c), which are analogously augmented with “give-reward” actions, and with
inequity aversion (IA) agents [16]. We also show the approximate upper bound on performance by
training a fully-centralized actor-critic (Cen) that is (unfairly) allowed to optimize joint reward.
5 Results
We find that LIO agents reach near-optimal collective performance in all three environments, despite
being designed to optimize only individual rewards. This arose in ER and Cleanup because incen-
tivization enabled agents to find an optimal division of labor5 and in IPD where LIO is proven to
converge to the CC solution. In contrast, various baselines displayed competitive behavior that led
to suboptimal solutions, were not robust across random seeds, or failed to cooperate altogether. We
report the results of 20 independent runs for IPD and ER, and 5 runs for Cleanup.
Figure 4: The sum of all
agents’ rewards in IPD.
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In accord with the theoretical prediction
of exact LIO in Section 3.2 and Appendix B, two LIO agents with policy
gradient approximation converge near the optimal CC solution with joint
reward -2 in the IPD (Figure 4). This meets the performance of LOLA-PG
and is close to LOLA-Ex, as reported in [11]. In the asymmetric case
(LIO-asym) where one LIO agent is paired with a PG agent, we indeed
find that they converge to the DC solution: PG is incentivized to cooperate
while LIO defects, resulting in collective reward near -3.
Escape Room. Figures 5a and 5c show that groups of LIO agents are
able to discover a division of labor in both the N = 2 and N = 3 cases,
whereby some agent(s) cooperate by pulling the lever to allow another agent to exit the door, such
that collective return approaches the optimal value (9 for the 2-player case, 8 for the 3-player case).
Fully-decentralized LIO-dec successfully solved both cases, albeit with slower learning speed. As
expected, PG agents were unable to find a cooperative solution: they either stay at the start state or
greedily move to the door, resulting in negative collective return. The augmented baselines PG-d
and PG-c sometimes successfully influence the learning of another agent to solve the game, but
exhibit high variance across independent runs. This is strong evidence that conventional RL alone
5Learned behavior in Cleanup can be viewed at https://sites.google.com/view/neurips2020-lio
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Figure 6: Results on Cleanup. (a,c) Emergent division of labor between LIO agents enables higher
performance than AC and IA baselines, which find rewards but exhibit competitive behavior. (b)
Behavior of incentive function in 7x7 Cleanup at different training checkpoints, measured against
three scripted opponents: R moves within river without cleaning; C successfully cleans waste; M fires
the cleaning beam but misses waste (mean and standard error of 20 evaluation episodes). (d) 10x10
map: the LIO agent who becomes a “Cleaner” receives incentives, while the “Harvester” does not.
is not well suited for learning to incentivize, as the effect of “give-reward” actions manifests only
in future episodes. LOLA succeeds sometimes but with high variance, as it does not benefit from
the stabilizing effects of online cross-validation and separation of the incentivization channel from
regular actions. Appendix E.1 contains results in an asymmetric case (LIO paired with PG), where
we compare to an additional heuristic two-timescale baseline and a variant of LIO.
To understand the behavior of LIO’s incentive function, we classify each agent at the end of training
as either a “cooperator” or “winner” based on whether its final policy has greater probability of
going to the lever or door, respectively. For each agent type, aggregating over all agents of that type,
we measure incentives received by that agent type when it takes each of the three actions during
training. Figures 5b and 5d show that the cooperator was correctly incentivized for pulling the lever
and receives negligible incentives for noncooperative actions. Asymptotically, the agent who “wins”
the game receives negligible incentives from the cooperator(s), who learned to avoid the cost for
incentivization (6) when doing so has no benefits itself.
Cleanup. Figures 6a and 6c show that LIO agents collected significantly more extrinsic rewards
than AC and IA baselines in Cleanup, and approach the upper bound on performance as indicated
by Cen, on both a 7x7 map and a 10x10 map with more challenging depletion threshold and lower
apple respawn rates. LIO agents discovered a division of labor (Figure 11a), whereby one agent
specializes to cleaning waste at the river while the other agent, who collects almost all of the apples,
provides incentives to the former. In contrast, AC baselines learned to perform cleaning for apples to
spawn but subsequently compete to collect apples, which is suboptimal for the group (Figure 11b).
Due to continual exploration by all agents, an agent may change its behavior if it receives incentives
for “wrong actions”: e.g., near episode 30k in Figure 6a, an agent temporarily stopped cleaning
the river despite having consistently done so earlier. We can further understand the progression
of LIO’s incentive function during training as follows. First, we classify LIO agents at the end of
training as a “Cleaner” or a “Harvester”, based on whether it primarily cleans waste or collected
apples, respectively. Periodically during training, we evaluated each agent against each of three
hand-scripted agents: an R agent moves in the river but does not clean, a C agent successfully cleans
waste, and an M agent fires the cleaning beam but misses waste. Figure 6b shows the incentives
given by a Harvester to these scripted agents at different times in training. At episodes 10k, 30k and
35k, it gave more incentives to C than to M, meaning that it distinguished between successful and
unsuccessful cleaning, which explains how its actual partner in training was incentivized to become a
Cleaner. Figure 6d shows the actual incentives received by Cleaner and Harvester agents when they
are positioned in the river, fire the cleaning beam, or successfully clear waste during training. We see
that asymptotically, only Harvesters provide incentives to Cleaners and not the other way around.
6 Conclusion and future directions
We created Learning to Incentivize Others (LIO), an agent who learns to give rewards directly
to other RL agents. LIO learns an incentive function by explicitly accounting for the impact of
incentives on its own extrinsic objective, through the learning updates of reward recipients. In the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, an illustrative Escape Room game, and a benchmark social dilemma
problem called Cleanup, LIO correctly incentivizes other agents to overcome extrinsic penalties so as
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to discover cooperative behaviors, such as division of labor, and achieve near-optimum collective
performance. We further demonstrated the feasibility of a fully-decentralized implementation of LIO.
Our approach to the goal of ensuring cooperation in a decentralized multi-agent population poses
many open questions. How should one analyze the simultaneous processes of learning incentive
functions, which continuously modifies the set of equilibria, and learning policies with these changing
rewards? How can one account for the cost for incentives in a more adaptive way? How should
agents better account for the longer-term effect of incentives? Should social factors among an agent
population modulate the effect of incentives? We hope our work will spark further interest in this
research endeavor.
Broader Impact
Our work is a step toward the goal of ensuring the common good in a potential future where
independent reinforcement learning agents interact with one another and/or with humans in the real
world. We have shown that cooperation can emerge by introducing an additional learned incentive
function that enables one agent to affect another agent’s reward directly. However, as agents still
independently maximize their own individual rewards, it is open as to how to prevent an agent from
misusing the incentive function to exploit others. One approach for future research to address this
concern is to establish new connections between our work and the emerging literature on reward
tampering [10]. By sparking a discussion on this important aspect of multi-agent interaction, we
believe our work has a positive impact on the long-term research endeavor that is necessary for RL
agents to be deployed safely in real-world applications.
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A Further discussion
A.1 Cost for incentivization
We justify the way in which LIO accounts for the cost of incentivization as follows. Recall that
this cost is incurred in the objective for LIO’s incentive function (see (5) and (6)), instead of being
accounted in the total reward (1) that is maximized by LIO’s policy. Fundamentally, the reason is that
the cost should be incurred only by the part of the agent that is directly responsible for incentivization.
In LIO, the policy and incentive function are separate modules: while the former takes regular actions
to maximize external rewards, only the latter produces incentives that directly and actively shape the
behavior of other agents. The policy is decoupled from incentivization, and it would be incorrect to
penalize it for the behavior of the incentive function. Instead, we need to attribute the cost directly to
the incentive function parameters via (6). From a more intuitive perspective, LIO is constructed with
the knowledge that it can perform two fundamentally different behaviors—1) take regular actions
that affect the Markov game transition, and 2) give incentives to shape other agents’ learning—and it
knows not to penalize the former behavior with the latter behavior. In contrast, if one were to augment
conventional RL with reward-giving actions (as we do for baselines in Section 4.2), then the cost for
incentivization should indeed be accounted by the policy. One may consider other mechanisms for
cost, such as budget constraints [24].
In our experiments, we find the coefficient α in the cost for incentivization is a sensitive parameter.
At the beginning of training, (6) immediately drives the magnitude of incentives to zero. However,
both the reward-giver and recipients require sufficient time to learn the effect of incentives, which
means that too large an α would lead to the degenerate result of rηi = 0. On the other extreme,
α = 0 means there is no penalty and may result in profligate incentivization that serves no useful
purpose. While we found that values of 10−3 and 10−4 worked well in our experiments, one may
consider adaptive and dynamic computation of α for more efficient training.
B Analysis in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Proposition 1. Two LIO agents converge to mutual cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Proof. We prove this by deriving closed-form expressions for the updates to parameters of policies
and incentive functions. These updates are also used to compute the vector fields shown in Figure 2.
Let θi for i ∈ {1, 2} denote each agent’s probability of taking the cooperative action. Let η1 :=
[η1C , η
1
D] ∈ R2 denote Agent 1’s incentive function, where the values are given to Agent 2 when it
takes action a2 = C or a2 = D. Similarly, let η2 denote Agent 2’s incentive function. The value
function for each agent is defined by
V i(θ1, θ2) =
∞∑
t=0
γtpT ri =
1
1− γ p
T ri ,
where p =
[
θ1θ2, θ1(1− θ2), (1− θ1)θ2, (1− θ1)(1− θ2)] . (11)
The total reward received by each agent is
r1 =
[−1 + η2C ,−3 + η2C , 0 + η2D,−2 + η2D] , (12)
r2 =
[−1 + η1C , 0 + η1D,−3 + η1C ,−2 + η1D] . (13)
Agent 2 updates its policy via the update
θˆ2 = θ2 + α∇θ2V 2(θ1, θ2)
= θ2 +
α
1− γ∇θ2
(
θ1θ2(−1 + η1C) + θ1(1− θ2)η1D
+ (1− θ1)θ2(−3 + η1C) + (1− θ1)(1− θ2)(−2 + η1D)
)
= θ2 +
α
1− γ
(
η1C − η1D − 1
)
,
(14)
and likewise for Agent 1:
θˆ1 = θ1 +
α
1− γ
(
η2C − η2D − 1
)
. (15)
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Figure 7: Vector fields showing the probability of recipient cooperation versus incentive value given
for cooperation (top row) and defection (lower row). Each plot has a fixed value for the incentive
given for the other action.
Let pˆ denote the joint action probability under updated policies θˆ1 and θˆ2, and let ∆2 := (η1C − η1D −
1)α/(1− γ) denote Agent 2’s policy update. Agent 1 updates its incentive function parameters via
η1 ← η1 + β∇η1 1
1− γ pˆ
T r1
= η1 +
β
1− γ∇η1
[
θˆ1(θ2 + ∆2)(−1 + η2C) + θˆ1(1− θ2 −∆2)(−3 + η2C)
+(1− θˆ1)(θ2 + ∆2)η2D + (1− θˆ1)(1− θ2 −∆2)(−2 + η2D)
]
= η1 +
βα
(1− γ)2B2
[
1
−1
]
,
(16)
where the scalar B2 is
B2 = θˆ
1(−1 + η2C)− θˆ1(−3 + η2C) + (1− θˆ1)η2D − (1− θˆ1)(−2 + η2D) = 2 . (17)
By symmetry, with B1 = 2, Agent 2 updates its incentive function via
η2 ← η2 + βα
(1− γ)2B1
[
1
−1
]
. (18)
Note that each ηi is updated so that ηiC increases while η
i
D decreases. Referring to (14) and (15),
one sees that the updates to incentive parameters lead to updates to policy parameters that increase
the probability of mutual cooperation. This is consistent with the viewpoint of modifying the Nash
Equilibrium of the payoff matrices. With incentives, the players have payoff matrices in Table 2. For
CC to be the global Nash Equilibrium, such that cooperation is preferred by an agent i regardless of
the other agent’s action, incentives must satisfy ηiC − ηiD − 1 > 0. This is guaranteed to occur by
incentive updates (16) and (18).
Table 2: Payoff matrices for row player (left) and column player (right) with incentives.
A1 C D
C -1 + η2C -3 + η
2
C
D 0 + η2D -2 + η
2
D
A2 C D
C -1 + η1C 0 + η
1
D
D -3 + η1C -2 + η
1
D
C Derivations
The factor∇θˆjJ i(τˆ i, θˆ) (9) in the incentive function’s gradient (7) is derived as follows. For brevity,
we will drop the “hat” notation—recall that it indicates a quantity belongs to a new trajectory after a
regular policy update—as all quantities here have “hats”. Let ∇j denote ∇θˆj and pi denote pi(at|st).
Let V i,pi(s) and Qi,pi(s,a) denote the global value and action-value function for agent i’s reward
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under joint policy pi. Then the gradient of agent i’s expected extrinsic return with respect to agent j’s
policy parameter can be derived in a similar manner as standard policy gradients [35]:
∇jJ i(τ,θ) = ∇jV i,pi(s0) = ∇j
∑
a
pi(a|s0)Qi,pi(s0,a)
=
∑
a
pi−j
(
(∇jpij)Qi,pi(s0,a) + pij∇jQi,pi(s0,a)
)
=
∑
a
pi−j
(
(∇jpij)Qi,pi + pij∇j
(
ri + γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s0,a)V i,pi(s′)
))
=
∑
a
pi−j
(
(∇jpij)Qi,pi + γpij
∑
s′
P (s′|s0,a)∇jV i,pi(s′)
)
=
∑
x
∞∑
k=0
P (s0 → x, k,pi)γk
∑
a
pi−j∇jpijQi,pi(x,a)
=
∑
s
dpi(s)
∑
a
pi−j∇jpijQi,pi(s,a)
=
∑
s
dpi(s)
∑
a
pi−jpij∇j log pijQi,pi(s,a)
= Epi
[∇j log pij(aj |s)Qi,pi(s,a)]
Alternatively, one may rely on automatic differentiation in modern machine learning frameworks [1]
to compute the chain rule (7) via direct minimization of the loss (10). This is derived as follows. Let
the notation 6= j, i denote all indices except j and i. Note that agent i’s updated policy pˆii is not a
function of ηi, as it does not receive incentives from itself. Recall that a recipient j’s updated policy
pˆij has explicit dependence on a reward-giver i’s incentive parameters ηi. Also note that
∇ηi pˆi−i =
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi pˆij)pˆi 6=j,i
by the product rule. Then we have:
∇ηiJ i(τˆ i, θˆ) = ∇ηiV i,pˆi(sˆ0) = ∇ηi
∑
aˆ
pˆii(aˆi|sˆ0)pˆi−i(aˆ−i|sˆ0)Qi,pˆi(sˆ0, aˆ)
=
∑
aˆ
pˆii
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi pˆij)pˆi 6=j,iQi,pˆi + pˆi−i∇ηiQi,pˆi
 (by the remarks above)
=
∑
aˆ
pˆii
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi pˆij)pˆi 6=j,iQi,pˆi + γpˆi−i
∑
s′
P (s′|sˆ0, aˆ)∇ηiV i,pˆi(s′)

=
∑
x
∞∑
k=0
P (s0 → x, k, pˆi)γk
∑
aˆ
pˆii
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi pˆij)pˆi 6=j,iQi,pˆi
=
∑
sˆ
dpˆi(sˆ)
∑
aˆ
pˆii
∑
j 6=i
pˆij(∇ηi log pˆij)pˆi 6=j,iQi,pˆi
=
∑
sˆ
dpˆi(sˆ)
∑
aˆ
pˆii
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi log pˆij)pˆi−iQi,pˆi
=
∑
sˆ
dpˆi(sˆ)
∑
aˆ
pˆi
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi log pˆij)Qi,pˆi = Epˆi
∑
j 6=i
(∇ηi log pˆij)Qi,pˆi

Hence descending a stochastic estimate of this gradient is equivalent to minimizing the loss in (10).
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D Experiments
D.1 Environment details
This section provides more details on each experimental setup.
IPD. We used the same definition of observation, action, and rewards as Foerster et al. [11]. Each
environment step is one round of the matrix game. Each agent observes the joint action taken by both
agents at the previous step, along with an indicator for the first round of each episode. We trained for
60k episodes, each with 5 environments steps, which gives the same total number of environment
steps used by LOLA [11].
Escape Room. Each agent observes all agents’ positions and can move among the three available
states: lever, start, and door. At every time step, all agents commit to and disclose their chosen
actions, compute the incentives based on their observations of state and others’ actions (only for LIO
and augmented baselines that allow incentivization), and receive the sum of extrinsic rewards and
incentives (if any). LIO and augmented baselines also observe the cumulative incentives given to
the other agents within the current episode. An agent’s individual reward is zero for staying at the
current state, -1 for movement away from its current state if fewer than M agents move to (or are
currently at) the lever, and +10 for moving to (or staying at) the door if ≥M agents pull the lever.
Each episode terminates when an agent successfully exits the door, or when 5 time steps elapse.
Cleanup. We built on a version of an open-source implementation [37]. The environment settings
for 7x7 and 10x10 maps are given in Table 3. To focus on the core aspects of the common-pool
resource problem, we removed rotation actions, set the orientation of all agents to face “up”, and
disabled their “tagging beam” (which, if used, would remove a tagged agent from the environment
for a number of steps). These changes mean that an agent must move to the river side of the map to
clear waste successfully, as it cannot simply stay in the apple patch and fire its cleaning beam toward
the river. Acting cooperatively as such would allow other agents to collect apples, and hence our
setup increases the difficulty of the social dilemma. Each agent receives an egocentric normalized
RGB image observation that spans a sufficiently large area such that the entire map is observable
by that agent regardless of its position. The cleaning beam has length 5 and width 3. For LIO and
the AC-c baseline, which have a separate module that observes other agents’ actions and outputs
real-valued incentives, we let that module observe a multi-hot vector that indicates which agent(s)
used their cleaning beam.
Table 3: Environment settings in Cleanup
Parameter 7x7 10x10
appleRespawnProbability 0.5 0.3
thresholdDepletion 0.6 0.4
thresholdRestoration 0.0 0.0
wasteSpawnProbability 0.5 0.5
view_size 4 7
max_steps 50 50
D.2 Implementation
This subsection provides more details on implementation of all algorithms used in experiments. We
use fully-connected neural networks for function approximation in the IPD and ER, and convolutional
networks to process image observations in Cleanup. The policy network has a softmax output for
discrete actions in all environments. Within each environment, all algorithms use the same neural
architecture unless stated otherwise. We applied the open-source implementation of LOLA [11]
to ER. We use an exploration lower bound  that maps the learned policy pi to a behavioral policy
p˜i(a|s) = (1− )pi(a|s) + /|A|, with  decaying linearly from start to end by div episodes. We use
discount factor γ = 0.99. We use gradient descent for policy optimization, the Adam optimizer [19]
for training value functions (in Cleanup), and Adam optimizer for LIO’s incentive function.
The augmented policy gradient and actor-critic baselines, labeled as PG-c and AC-c, which have
continuous “give-reward” actions in addition to regular discrete actions, are trained as follows. These
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baselines have an augmented action space A× RN−1 and learns a factorized policy pi(ad, ar|o) :=
pi(ad|o)pi(ar|o), where ad ∈ A is a regular discrete action and ar ∈ RN−1 is the reward given to
the other N − 1 agents. The factor pi(ad|o) is a standard categorical distribution conditioned on
observation. The factor pi(ar|o) is defined via an element-wise sigmoid σ(·) applied to samples from
a multivariate diagonal Gaussian, so that pi(ar|o) is bounded. Specifically, we let u ∼ N (fη(o),1),
where fη(o) : O 7→ RN−1 is a neural network with parameters η, and let ar = Rmaxσ(u). By
the change of variables formula, pi(ar|o) has density pi(ar|o) = N (µη,1)
∏N−1
i=1 (dar[i]/du[i])
−1,
which can be used to compute the log-likelihood of pi(ad, ar|o) in the policy gradient.
Let β denote the coefficient for entropy of the policy, αθ the policy learning rate, αη the incentive
learning rate, αφ the critic learning rate, and Ra the value of the discrete “give-reward” action.
IPD. The policy network and the incentive function in LIO have two hidden layers of size 16 and 8.
Table 4: Hyperparameters in IPD.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.1 αθ 1e-3
start 1.0 αη 1e-3
end 0.01 α 0
div 5000 Rmax 3.0
ER. The policy network has two hidden layers of size 64 and 32. LIO’s incentive function has two
hidden layers of size 64 and 16. We use a separate Adam optimizer for the cost part of the incentive
function’s objective (5), with learning rate 1e-4, with αη = 1e-3, and set α = 1.0. Exploration and
learning rate hyperparameters were tuned for each algorithm via coordinate ascent, searching through
start in [0.5, 1.0], end in [0.05, 0.1, 0.3], div in [100, 1000], β in [0.01, 0.1], αθ, αη, and αcost in
[1e-3, 1e-4]. LOLA performed best with learning rate 0.1 and Ra = 2.0, but it did not benefit from
additional exploration. LIO and PG-c have Rmax = 2.0. PG-d used Ra = 2.0.
Table 5: Hyperparameters in Escape Room.
N = 2 N = 3
Parameter LIO PG PG-d PG-c LIO PG PG-d PG-c
β 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1
start 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0
end 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.05 0.05 0.1
div 1e3 1e2 1e2 1e3 1e3 1e2 1e2 1e3
αθ 1e-4 1e-4 1e-4 1e-3 1e-4 1e-4 1e-4 1e-3
Cleanup. All algorithms are based on actor-critic for policy optimization, whereby each agent j’s
policy parameter θj is updated via
θˆj ← θj + Epi
[
∇θj log piθj (aj |oj)
(
rj + γVφj (s
′)− Vφ˜j (s)
)]
, (19)
and the critic parameter φj is updated by minimizing the temporal difference loss
L(φj) = Es,s′∼pi
[(
rj + γVφ˜j (s
′)− Vφj (s)
)2]
(20)
The target network [25] parameters φ˜j are updated via φ˜j ← τφj + (1− τ)φ˜j with τ = 0.01.
The policy and value networks have an input convolutional layer with 6 filters of size [3, 3], stride
[1, 1], and ReLU activation. The output of convolution is flattened and passed through two fully-
connected (FC) hidden layers both of size 64. The policy output is a softmax over discrete actions; the
value network has a linear scalar output. LIO’s incentive function uses the same input convolutional
layer, except that its output is passed through the first FC layer, concatenated with its observation of
other agents’ actions, then passed through the second FC layer and finally to a linear output layer.
Inequity Aversion agents [16] have an additional 1D vector observation of all agents’ temporally
16
start lever0 0
-1
-1
(a) Agent A2 incurs an extrinsic
penalty for any change of state.
start door-1 -1
-1
-1
(b) Agent A1 is penalized at every
step if A2 does not pull the lever.
start door-1 +10
+10
-1
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Figure 8: Asymmetric Escape Room game involving two agents, A1 and A2. (a) In the absence
of incentives, A2’s optimal policy is to stay at the start state and not pull the lever. (b) Hence A1
cannot exit the door and is penalized at every step. (c) A1 can receive positive reward if it learns to
incentivize A2 to pull the lever. Giving incentives is not an action depicted here.
smoothed rewards—this is concatenated with the output of the first FC hidden layer and sent to the
second FC layer. Entropy coefficient was held at 0.1 for all methods.
LIO and AC-c haveRmax = 2.0. AC-d usedRa = 2.0. Inequity aversion agents have disadvantageous
aversion coefficient value 0, advantageous aversion coefficient value 0.05, and temporal smoothing
parameter λ = 0.95. We use critic learning rate αφ = 10−3 for all methods. LIO used αη =1e-3
and cost coefficient α = 10−4. Exploration and learning rate hyperparameters were tuned for each
algorithm via coordinate ascent, searching through start in [0.5, 1.0], end in [0.05, 0.1], div in [100,
1000, 5000], αθ, αη , and αcost in [1e-3, 1e-4].
Table 6: Hyperparameters in Cleanup.
7x7 10x10
Parameter LIO AC AC-d AC-c IA LIO AC AC-d AC-c IA
start 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
end 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
div 100 100 100 100 1000 1000 5000 1000 1000 5000
αθ 1e-4 1e-3 1e-4 1e-4 1e-3 1e-4 1e-3 1e-3 1e-3 1e-3
E Additional results
E.1 Asymmetric Escape Room
We conducted additional experiments on an asymmetric version of the Escape Room game between
two learning agents (A1 and A2) as shown in Figure 8. A1 gets +10 extrinsic reward for exiting
a door and ending the game (Figure 8c), but the door can only be opened when A2 pulls a lever;
otherwise, A1 is penalized at every time step (Figure 8b). The extrinsic penalty for A2 discourages it
from taking the cooperative action (Figure 8a). The global optimum combined reward is +9, and it is
impossible for A2 to get positive extrinsic reward. Due to the asymmetry, A1 is the reward-giver and
A2 is the reward recipient for methods that allow incentivization. Each agent observes both agents’
positions, and can move between the two states available to itself. We allow A1 to observe A2’s
current action before choosing its own action, which is necessary for methods that learn to reward
A2’s cooperative actions. We use a standard policy gradient for A2 unless otherwise specified.
In addition to the baselines described for the symmetric case—namely, policy gradient (PG-rewards)
and LOLA with discrete “give-reward” actions—we also compare with a two-timescale method,
labeled 2-TS. A 2-TS agent has the same augmented action space as the PG-rewards baseline, except
that it learns over a longer time horizon than the reward recipient. Each “epoch” for the 2-TS agent
spans multiple regular episodes of the recipient, during which the 2-TS agent executes a fixed policy.
The 2-TS agent only caries out a learning update using a final terminal reward, which is the average
extrinsic rewards it gets during test episodes that are conducted at the end of the epoch. Performance
on test episodes serve as a measure of whether correct reward-giving actions were taken to influence
the recipient’s learning during the epoch. To our knowledge, 2-TS is a novel baseline but has key
limitations: the use of two timescales only applies to the asymmetric 2-player game, and requires fast
learning by the reward-recipient, chosen to be a tabular Q-learning, to avoid intractably long epochs.
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Figure 9: Results in asymmetric 2-player Escape Room. (a) LIO (paired with PG) converges rapidly
to the global optimum, 2-TS (paired with tabular Q-learner) converges slower, while policy gradient
baselines could not cooperate. (b) Two PG agents cannot cooperate, as A2 converges to “do-nothing”.
(c) A LIO agent (A1) attains near-optimum reward by incentivizing a PG agent (A2). (d) 1-episode
LIO has larger variance and lower performance. Normalization factors are 1/10 (A1) and 1/2 (A2).
Figure 9 shows the sum of both agents’ rewards for all methods on the asymmetric 2-player game,
as well as agent-specific performance for policy gradient and LIO, across training episodes. A LIO
reward-giver agent paired with a policy gradient recipient converges rapidly to a combined return
near 9.0 (Figure 9a), which is the global maximum, while both PG and PG-rewards could not escape
the global minimum for A1. LOLA paired with a PG recipient found the cooperative solution in
two out of 20 runs; this suggests the difficulty of using a fixed incentive value to conduct opponent
shaping via discrete actions. The 2-TS method is able to improve combined return but does so much
more gradually than LIO, because an epoch consists of many base episodes and it depends on a
highly delayed terminal reward. Figure 9b for two PG agents shows that A2 converges to the policy
of not moving (reward of 0), which results in A1 incurring penalties at every time step. In contrast,
Figure 9c verifies that A1 (LIO) receives the large extrinsic reward (scaled by 1/10) for exiting the
door, while A2 (PG) has average normalized reward above -0.5 (scaled by 1/2), indicating that it is
receiving incentives from A1. Average reward of A2 (PG) is below 0 because incentives given by A1
need not exceed 1 continually during training—once A2’s policy is biased toward the cooperative
action in early episodes, its decaying exploration rate means that it may not revert to staying put even
when incentives do not overcome the penalty for moving. Figure 9d shows results on a one-episode
version of LIO where the same episode is used for both policy update and incentive function updates,
with importance sampling corrections. This version performs significantly lower for A1 and gives
more incentives than is necessary to encourage A2 to move. It demonstrates the benefit of learning
the reward function using a separate episode from that in which it is applied.
E.2 Symmetric Escape Room
Figure 10 shows total reward (extrinsic + received - given incentives), counts of “lever” and “door”
actions, and received incentives in one training run each for ER(2,1) and ER(3,2). In Figure 10a, A1
becomes the winner and A2 the cooperator. It is not always necessary for A1 to give rewards. The
fact that LIO models the learning updates of recipients may allow it to find that reward-giving is un-
necessary during some episodes when the recipient’s policy is sufficiently biased toward cooperation.
In Figure 10b, A3 converges to going to the door, as it incentives A1 and A2 to pull the lever.
E.3 Cleanup
Figure 11a is a snapshot of the division of labor found by two LIO agents, whereby the blue agent
picks apples while the purple agent stays on the river side to clean waste. The latter does so because
of incentives from the former. In contrast, Figure 11b shows a time step where two AC agents
compete for apples, which is jointly suboptimal. Figure 11c shows the received incentives during
training in the 7x7 map, for each of two LIO agents that were classified after training as a “Cleaner”
or “Harvester”. Figure 11d shows the incentives given by a “Harvester” agent to three scripted agents
during each training checkpoint.
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Figure 10: Training dynamics: (a) N = 2: Agent 1 exits the door by giving incentives to Agent 2. (b)
N = 3: Agent 3 exits the door by giving incentives to Agents 1 & 2 (1 run).
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Figure 11: (a) In 7x7 Cleanup, one LIO agent learns to focus on cleaning waste, as it receives
incentives from the other who only collects apple. (b) In contrast, AC agents compete for apples after
cleaning. (c) Incentives received during training on 7x7 Cleanup. (d) Behavior of incentive function
against scripted opponent policies on 10x10 map.
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